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 This volume arises out of documentation and reflection by individuals and 
organisations across diverse regions, communities and cultures on existing and 
potential strategies of response to ‘crimes of honour’, seen primarily as a 
manifestation of  violence against women, and a violation of women’s human rights. 
It was catalysed in particular by the murder of two young women, Samia Sarwar in 
Pakistan and Rukhsana Naz in the United Kingdom, the reported responses of their 
families and the state, and the growing level of attention, regionally and 
internationally, to the issue of ‘crimes of honour.’ It discusses the actual and potential 
ground-level impact of this attention, which has grown substantially since 1999.   It 
also considers the changing global context of work on ‘honour crimes’, which is 
affected by developments such as the attacks of 11th September 2001 in the United 
States and their aftermath.  
 
This volume is an outcome of a collaborative, action-oriented research project 
aimed at mapping, disseminating information regarding and facilitating the 
development of strategies to combat ‘crimes of honour’. Initially, the collaboration 
was between INTERIGHTS,1 an international human rights organisation based in 
                                                 
1
 International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights, London, of which the South Asia 
Programme was primarily engaged in the Project.  
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London, and CIMEL,2 a research centre in the Law Department of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. However, it was conceived 
as, and developed into, collaboration with individuals and organisations in a number 
of different countries across the world over the five years of its operation.  
 
 
At the time the project began, it was apparent that while there were 
interventions being made to combat ‘crimes of honour’ within many contexts, 
communities and societies, knowledge and understanding of these were often not 
shared across different cultures and regions. Thus, increasing regional and 
international concern with the issue was not necessarily reflected in a growing or 
shared understanding either of the nature and extent of the crimes, or of the strategies 
and needs, or even the fact, of locally-placed actors already engaged in working in 
this area.  
 
Through the project, therefore, we aimed primarily to exchange information 
regarding and facilitate the development of strategies of response by activists, 
scholars, lawyers, community workers, policy makers and others committed to the 
elimination of these and related forms of violence. To this end, we supported locally-
based efforts by individuals and organisations to implement strategies of response in 
their own contexts, some of which are documented in the case studies included in this 
volume. Key elements of such strategies included interrogating the concept of 
‘honour’ itself, as well as challenging its invocation to justify violence against 
women.. In parallel, we set out to develop resources,  in terms of information and 
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 Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London. 
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analysis of the issue, which were made available initially to our partners, and later 
more widely through the project’s website.3 They include an annotated bibliography, 
which has been periodically updated, and incorporates case summaries as well as 
annotations of books, chapters, and articles.4 A ‘Directory of Initiatives to Address 
‘Crimes of Honour’’ was also compiled to facilitate networking and exchange 
between individuals and organisations from over twenty countries, and to provide a 
practical resource for those seeking expert information for legal or other purposes. A 
comprehensive and periodically updated compilation of the international human rights 
law materials sets out provisions of various international instruments relating to the 
rights implicated by ‘crimes of honour,’ and resolutions and reports of the United 
Nations, and UN human rights bodies (this includes documents cited by authors in 
this volume, such as Jane Connors and Purna Sen). In addition, reports of major 
international or national meetings convened by, and other documents generated 
through, the project, are available on the website.   
 
The Project’s framework is international human rights law, and both  
CIMEL and INTERIGHTS have a primarily legal brief. In particular, we situate 
‘crimes of honour’ within an understanding of violence against women which, as 
Coomeraswamy and Kois (1999, 177) point out, ‘accepts the fact that structures that 
perpetuate violence against women are socially constructed and that such violence is a 
product of a historical process and is not essential or time bound in its 
manifestations.’ Our law-focussed approach finds a certain resonance with various 
national and regional initiatives combating ‘crimes of honour’ around the world, as 
                                                 
3
 The website is at www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes. One of the dilemmas faced at the time of writing 
(October 2004) by the project, in common with other such efforts, is whether and how to maintain such 
resources in a useful (updated) form in the future. 
4
 Originally the bibliography was hosted on the websites of two co-operating institutions, the 
International Women’s Heath Coalition and the University of Minnesota’s Human Rights Centre. 
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evidenced by the country-specific papers in this volume. As Jane Connors sets out, 
international human rights law requires states to exercise due diligence in protecting 
women from such violations by private actors, while domestic legislation, court 
practice and informal legal structures vary in the level of protection and remedy they 
offer women, in particular where family or conjugal ‘honour’ is invoked. The impact 
of statutes, and efforts to change their provisions or application, are therefore central 
features of the research and advocacy efforts documented in this volume. At the level 
of society, informal codes mandating such conduct may be endorsed, to varying 
degrees, by some sectors of society, and challenged by others.  
 
In this connection, the operation and hold of ‘parallel legal systems’ in relation 
to ‘crimes of honour,’ is discussed in detail in this volume by Nadera Shalhoub-
Kevorkian and Nazand Begikhani, while less ‘formal’ customary laws and social 
norms and the way in which the state legal system endorses, accommodates or 
challenges these latter are a theme in almost all the country-specific contexts. In 
addition, religious laws, and the attitude of religious authorities, may be critical in 
forming or reinforcing and also in changing opinion and practice in this area. The role 
of the religious right –  political groupings that invoke religion and religious traditions 
as justifications for their activities, including those which seek to marginalise or 
obliterate the rights of women or minorities – is key here, as well as the role of those 
who challenge the validity of such positions.  
 
It is abundantly clear that a narrowly legal approach, particularly one 
focussing on ‘state law’ and state legal systems, as a stand-alone strategy 
unaccompanied by broader and deeper initiatives and understandings, is unlikely to 
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change practice or to effectively combat ‘crimes of honour.’ In this regard we 
recognise the limitations inherent in the fact that our ‘orientation towards 
circumscribed disciplines or subdisciplines remains strong’ (Dobash and Dobash, 
1998: 2). In particular, we look to the contribution of anthropologists in seeking to 
destabilise assumptions about ‘honour and shame’, sexuality, class, and the gendering 
process in specific contexts (Lindisfarne, 1993; Joseph, 1999). Nevertheless, by 
helping to ‘surface’ data and analysis from partners working in specific contexts, we 
hope to help dislodge the abstract in the debates on ‘crimes of honour,’ allowing more 
thorough examination of context-specific variables and facilitating analysis of the 
socio-political and economic contexts of ‘crimes of honour’ and related forms of 
violence against women. For purposes both of research and of advocacy, the law, 
whether as articulated in statute or as applied and interpreted by members of the 
judiciary, or as ‘unwritten’ law, describes a particular nexus of state, society and 
family, and gendering of relationships between these fields, and may be instrumental 
in the structuring of those relationships. Insisting on all these manifestations of the 
‘law’, and those who form it and apply it, as instruments of change, means working 
on the law itself as an instrument in need of change. 
 
This book reflects the primarily legal focus of most authors.  In this 
introduction, we try to set out some of the themes that have run through the project as 
a whole, and indeed the ongoing work by project partners within their particular 
contexts.  We look here at the uses and meanings of the phrase ‘honour crimes’, 
before proceeding to consider comparisons that are made with ‘crimes of passion’ and 
the issue of the partial defence of sexual provocation. We then consider the current 
popular association of ‘crimes of honour’ with Muslim majority societies or 
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communities, depite the widespread incidence of such crimes, and recent struggles to 
combat them, among Christian majority communities in Latin America or Southern 
Europe (see Silvia Pimental et al and Bettiga in this volume), as well as more ongoing 
efforts among Hindu and Sikh communities in India (see the paper by Uma 
Chakravarti). We also examine the complications that such associations bring for the 
work of local actors engaging in combating violence against women, and the 
particular challenges to addressing honour crimes occurring among religious 
minorities within multicultural societies. We go on to examine the antecedents of such 
crimes in colonial legislation and the latter’s continuing impact. Finally we conclude 
by raising questions, seeking responses to which informed the beginning of the 
project, and which we believe are of continuing relevance in the struggle to eliminate 
violence against women. 
 
   
‘Crimes of honour’ 
 
The project uses the term ‘crimes of honour’ to encompass a variety of 
manifestations of violence against women, including ‘honour killings’, assault, 
confinement or imprisonment, and interference with choice in marriage, where the 
publicly articulated ‘justification’ is attributed to a social order claimed to require the 
preservation of a concept of  ‘honour’ vested in male (family and/or conjugal) control 
over women and specifically women’s sexual conduct, actual, suspected or potential.  
 
The definition of ‘crimes of honour’ is by no means straightforward, and the 
imprecision and ‘exoticisation’ (in particular in the West) of its use are among the 
  7 
reasons for caution in use of the phrase. At its most basic, the term is commonly used 
as shorthand, to flag a type of violence against women characterised by (claimed) 
‘motivation’ rather than by perpetrator or form of manifestation. Definitions tend to 
be by way of illustration; thus, in a highly significant article on ‘crimes of honour’ 
and the construction of gender in the Arab world, Lama Abu Odeh explains that:  
 
A paradigmatic example of a crime of honour is the killing of a woman 
by her father or brother for engaging in, or being suspected of 
engaging in, sexual practices before or outside marriage. (Abu Odeh, 
1996: 141).  
 
In her 1999 Report, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women records 
receiving ‘numerous communications’ on the subject of ‘honour crimes’ against 
women, ‘whereby the family kills a female relative deemed to have defiled the honour 
of the family.’ She continues with information on ‘honour crimes’ in Lebanon:  
 
Honour is defined in terms of women’s assigned sexual and familial 
roles as dictated by traditional family ideology. Thus, adultery, 
premarital relationships (which may or may not include sexual 
relations), rape and falling in love with an “inappropriate” person may 
constitute violations of family honour.5 
 
Papers in this volume discuss the concept of ‘conjugal honour’ as well as 
‘family honour’ and document ‘honour killings’ by husbands and sexual intimates 
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 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/68 10 March 1999, para.18. 
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who are not blood relatives of the victim, thus extending the range of ‘paradigmatic’ 
perpetrators. It is also argued that in some contexts, the range of female behaviour 
considered to violate ‘honour’ goes beyond sexual conduct (actual, potential or 
suspected) to include other behaviours that challenge male control (Aida Touma-
Sliman notes ‘staying out late and smoking’, for example). At the same time, the 
contributions by Uma Chakravarti, Dina Siddiqi and Hannana Siddiqui clarify how 
these paradigms of ‘honour’ interfere with the right to choice in marriage across 
South Asia; forced marriage is one result, but other scenarios include being forced to 
remain in an unwanted relationship, or punished for leaving (or trying to leave) one, 
or exercising choice regarding whether to marry or not, and whom to marry. As well 
as the ‘honour’ invested in control over women and specifically women’s sexual 
conduct, control over economic and social resources and property are often intimately 
linked in these equations. In addition, papers in this volume (Nazand Begikhani, Aida 
Touma-Sliman, CEWLA, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian) note the significance attached 
to female virginity and the resulting imposition (or attempted imposition) of virginity 
testing on females suspected of having ‘violated’ family honour, including through 
having been subjected to rape. ‘Crimes of honour’ may thus include violations of a 
range of rights as well as the more ‘paradigmatic’ ‘honour killings.’ The role of 
women family members in instigating or colluding with honour crimes, particularly in 
enforcing controls over marriage choices, and also in acts of violence, is also brought 
out in this volume (Dina Siddiqi, Daniel Hoyek et al., CEWLA, Purna Sen) as an 
issue that requires greater consideration and explanation.  
 
Working on ‘crimes of honour’ as a form of violence against women does not 
imply that men also are not subjected to such crimes. For example, in the province of 
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Sindh in 1998, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan analysed the deaths of 97 
men as well as 158 women in karo-kari ‘honour killings’ (Amnesty International, 
1999: 6). Again, in cases of forced marriage or interference with the right of choice 
whether or not and whom to marry, pressure from older family members over younger 
members will apply to men as well as to women.  In the realm of fiction, the story of 
the ‘honour killing’ set by Gabriel Garcia Marquez in a Colombian village, and given 
legal-sociological analysis by Teubner (1992) is of the murder by two brothers of the 
male seducer of their sister. However, women remain the majority of victims and 
survivors of ‘crimes of honour’, and have fewer available remedies. Therefore 
development of strategies of support can effectively draw on the existing frameworks 
established to address all manifestations of violence against women. Where necessary, 
such strategies also involve challenging existing frameworks in order to secure 
women’s rights and liberties; thus women’s rights and human rights organisations 
have questioned the practice of placing women seeking to exercise their right to 
choice in marriage in ‘protective custody’ pending a judicial decision  (see 
discussions by Uma Chakravarti and Dina Siddiqi).  
 
Among feminist and rights activists seeking to eliminate such violence, there 
is deep discomfort over the apparent meaning of the term ‘honour’ in the construction 
‘crimes of honour’ as this seems to imply that women ‘embody’ the honour of males. 
There is also resistance to accepting a notion of honour that endorses and indeed 
requires violence against women, epitomised in the extreme example of an ‘honour 
killing.’ Thus in 1994, Al-Badil (‘The Alternative’), established from organisations 
within the Palestinian community in Israel, called itself the Coalition to Combat the 
Crime of ‘Family Honour’ (see further Aida Touma-Sliman in this volume), 
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encapsulating through quotation marks its own interrogation of the term. In its 
statement of purpose the organisation observed:  
 
it is not possible to give the term [‘family honour’] a positive 
understanding, since it attributes all the maladies of society to 
women’s bodies and individual behaviour, giving legitimacy to 
social conduct restricting women’s freedom and development, using 
all forms of violence, the most extreme being murder.  
 
 In a Roundtable convened by the CIMEL/INTERIGHTS project in 1999 
(Welchman, 2000: 452), activists, academics, journalists and lawyers from different 
countries considered the use of concepts of ‘honour’ in strategies of response and 
resistance.  It was pointed out that in Pakistan, activists have named the killers of 
women as dishonourable, in an attempt to destabilise the prevailing understanding of 
‘honour’. In the UK, women’s rights activists argued that Zoora Shah, a British 
Pakistani woman convicted of the murder of a man whom she claimed to have 
subjected her to years of physical, sexual and economic abuse, had been in effect 
considered by the Court of Appeal to have no honour left to transgress; more recently, 
the slogan ‘there is no “honour” in domestic violence, only shame’ was invoked 
during  the memorial of Heshu Yones (see further Hannana Siddiqui in this volume). 
Recovering or reclaiming the notion of ‘honour’ would reformulate it as attaching to 
women as well as to men, designating qualities of respect, tolerance and inclusivity. 
However, some participants sounded a note of caution, seeing risks (as exemplified in 
Zoora Shah’s case) in seeking to recover a notion of honour as an attribute of women, 
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given a context of court processes dominated by prevailing notions of honour as 
attaching exclusively to men or to male-headed families.  
 
In the search for a better way of naming, the majority of ‘honour killings’ 
appear to fit into the understanding of femicide defined by Radford (1992: 3) as ‘the 
misogynous killing of women by men’ and as ‘a form of sexual violence’. She uses 
the concept of “sexual violence” as a continuum in a radical feminist analysis:  
 
The notion of a continuum further facilitates the analysis of male sexual 
violence as a form of control central to the maintenance of patriarchy.[…] 
Relocating femicide within the continuum of sexual violence establishes 
its significance in terms of sexual politics. (Radford 1992, 4).   
 
Further developing this notion, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2002) argues for 
another continuum, in which ‘femicide’ would indicate a range of acts and situations 
including not only the physical killing of women because they are women, but also 
threats and other components of the ‘arduous process leading up to the actual death’. 
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian situates her proposal solidly in the framework of her 
clinical experience in Palestinian society while recommending it also for analysis of 
other societies in light of the cross-cultural nature of the phenomenon of femicide.  
 
It is clear that most ‘honour killings’ fit immediately into both the narrower 
and wider understandings of femicide proposed above, while other ‘crimes of honour’ 
(such as interference with choice in marriage, physical abuse, intimidation, 
deprivation of liberty) might be covered either by the sexual violence continuum or by 
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Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s expanded definition of femicide. Such methods of 
naming have the clear advantage of unpacking the term and indicating the socio-
economic and patriarchal frameworks in which such acts are committed and 
sustained, rather than reproducing the representation of that framework, with or 
without quotation marks around ‘honour’ to indicate the user’s interrogation of the 
term. The assimilation of such crimes to a wider framework has the added advantage 
of avoiding the self-exculpation undertaken by some in the West who view such 
crimes as a problem of ‘the other’, risking paternalistic and ineffective interventions 
and the ‘demonisation’ of particular communities and, in particular, men within them.  
 
The use of the term ‘honour crime’, or specifically ‘honour killing’, has at 
least two further risks: firstly that it takes the description articulated by the 
perpetrator; and secondly, that reproducing the term may obscure (as may be the 
intention on the part of the perpetrator) the “real motivation” (or at least, contributing 
motivational factors) for the crime or attempted crime. In regard to the latter, 
sociological investigations of ‘family honour’ in different contexts indicate that ‘the 
normative claim of honor often is mixed with social, economic, or political motives’ 
(Araji, 2000) – that is, that ‘family honour’ is tied to social standing and mobility, and 
economic opportunities.  For example, Nafisa Shah quotes Sardar Sultan Mugheri in 
Sindh as stating that: 
 
Ghairat (what is sacred and inviolable) is izzat (honour, dignity) and this 
comes with money and property. And if izzat is violated – then it is 
justified to kill and die for honour. (Shah, 1998: 239). 
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Besides the general and familiar association of women with property in the 
‘honour’ paradigm, there are many instances in which the primary motivation for an 
‘honour crime’ is more directly something other than ‘honour’ – a brother’s 
arguments with his sister over inheritance, for example, or a husband’s desire to be rid 
of a wife, with a murder not so much covered up as proclaimed as a matter of 
‘honour’ in the expectation of a minimal punishment and less disapprobation from at 
least some sections of society than otherwise would have been the case.6 The claims 
of ‘honour’ may be a contributing factor, but as Nafisa Shah has commented, ‘Vested 
interests… use the excuse of honour as a blanket cover for a multitude of sins.’7 And 
mostly, the voice of victim in her own ‘defence’ is absent, as underlined by studies in 
this volume.  
 
As to the problem of reproducing, even in quotations marks, the articulated 
motivation of the perpetrator or sympathisers in the family or society, we come up 
against the questions posed by Dobash and Dobash (1998: 4) in regard to the source 
of definitions of violence against women: 
 
Do we use the perspectives of victims? Of those who perpetrate the acts? 
Of researchers? Of the law? Of policymakers? Should researchers attempt 
to develop distinct, abstract, and definitive conceptualizations of these 
acts? 
 
In this volume, Purna Sen suggests (in relation to the paradigmatic honour 
killings) six elements that could be used to distinguish ‘honour crimes’ from other 
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 Journalist Rana Husseini made these points to the CIMEL/INTERIGHTS Roundtable: see Welchman, 
2000, 442. 
7
 In Newsline, cited in Amnesty International, 1999, 23. 
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acts of violence against women, moving us away from reliance on the perpetrator’s 
articulation of motive. The CIMEL/INTERIGHTS project has tended to use a less 
methodical combination of definitions implied in the short-hand of the phrase ‘crimes 
of honour’ – those of perpetrators, of policymakers and to a certain extent of law – 
from the perspective of challenges made to those definitions by advocates of change, 
including some of our project partners. In this volume, Uma Chakravarti argues 
against continued use of the term ‘crimes of honour’ because ‘as feminists, we must 
discard the term in search of another that does not mask the violence in the killings 
and abuses,’ and ‘because the violence becomes associated with the ‘uniqueness of 
Asian cultures, with irrational communities and aberrant and archaic patriarchal 
practices refusing to modernise’ (see also Purna Sen in this volume).   
 
Still, problematic though it is, the term ‘crimes of honour’ has some uses in 
particular contexts. It is used in the project, as by some activists, to destabilise the 
notion of ‘honour’ as a received good when connected with crime. It is also used to 
extend an understanding of what might be called ‘crimes of honour’ beyond ‘honour 
killings’, one way of demonstrating the continuum of acts of violence on which 
‘honour killings’ stand. It has obvious descriptive implications in its indication of the 
link that may, in particular contexts, be assumed in law, judicial process and societal 
practice connecting a ‘crime’ with a mitigating value, ‘honour.’ The idea of mitigation 
or impunity in statute or judicial practice for a ‘crime of honour’ is most immediately 
evoked in ‘honour killing’, but it also arises in other manifestations of crimes of 
‘honour’.  
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The most obvious advantage of the use of the phrase ‘honour crimes’ in an 
English-language context is the wide recognition of the term, but this is at the same 
time increasingly problematic. In this volume, Hannana Siddiqui criticises the ‘loose 
use’ of the term by the Metropolitan Police in their attempts to address a number of 
murders within minority communities in the UK. The association of phenomena of 
‘crimes of honour’ with the ‘East’ (Abu Odeh, 1997 and see Uma Chakravarti in this 
volume) – and often with Muslim societies in particular – is one of the problematics. 
In a Guardian report (5 July 2004) entitled ‘Turkey gets to grips with “honour 
killings”’ the one specific case example given was from an Amnesty International 
report which ‘highlighted the case of a man who had a 24-year prison term for 
stabbing his partner to death reduced to two and a half years after producing 
photographs of the woman with another man.’ In an explanatory memorandum for the 
Council of Europe’s parliamentary assembly in support of a resolution on ‘Crimes of 
Honour,’ rapporteur Ann Cryer (a British MP) included in ‘cases of so-called “honour 
crimes” in Europe’ another Turkish case, that of a man who ‘cut his pregnant wife’s 
throat with a knife because he suspected that she was having an affair.’8 On the bald 
facts, both cases might suggest use of a defence of ‘provocation’ rather than ‘honour’, 
were it not, apparently, for the fact that they happened in Turkey. Ann Cryer’s report 
did include an attempt at definitions, which identified ‘honour crimes’ according to 
the claim of the perpetrator, and continued: 
 
The so-called ‘honour crimes’ should not be confused with the concept of 
‘crimes of passion.’  Whereas the latter is normally limited to a crime that 
is committed by one partner (or husband and wife) in a relationship on the 
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 AS/EGA (2002) 7 rev 2, 4 June 2002, para.32. 
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other as a spontaneous (emotional or passionate) reply (often citing a 
defence of ‘sexual provocation’), the former may involve the abuse or 
murder of (usually) women by one of more close family members 
(including partners) in the name of individual or family honour.9 
 
Besides the fact that this definition presents ‘crimes of passion’ as gender 
neutral (in the face of the facts), it brings us to the issues of the link between ‘crimes 
of passion’ and ‘crimes of honour’. Different positions have been taken regarding the 
utility of this comparison (see Purna Sen in this volume) but the juxtaposition at least 
underlines the argument that both are manifestations of femicide where culturally 
positive values legally/judicially mitigate the murder of women from, arguably, 
motivations of male control, whether named as ‘honour’ or ‘passion.’10 
 
Crimes of honour, crimes of passion 
 
In her paper, Jane Connors notes that among the disagreements at UN 
discussions of ‘crimes of honour’ from the year 2000 was the inclusion of ‘crimes of 
passion’ with ‘crimes of honour’ in resolutions on violence against women.11 She 
notes the objection of the representative of Jordan, to the effect that ‘How could states 
possibly exercise due diligence to prevent such crimes, if the crime in question is 
                                                 
9
 Ibid para 3. 
10
 Compare, in the ‘West’, the popular perception of a ‘cold blooded killer’ to that of a man who kills in 
a crime of passion; as Leader-Elliott, 1997, 162, describes the latter: ‘The ordinary man is a sanguine 
man, a hot man, whose blood boils when his most vital interests are threatened’.  
11
 Note that in the UN General Assembly resolution, ‘Working towards the Elimination of Crimes 
Against Women and Girls Committed in the Name of Honour’ (UN Doc. A/C.3/59/L.25) passed on 
15th October 2004, reference to ‘crimes of passion’  was omitted. See further Jane Connors and Purna 
Sen in this volume.   
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committed in a sudden spurt of rage?’12 The significance of this intervention lies in 
the fact that most defences in criminal cases of ‘honour killings’ of women in Jordan 
argue that the crime was committed in a ‘fit of fury’, or indeed a ‘sudden spurt of 
anger’ in reaction to some (alleged) conduct on the part of the woman, allowing the 
court to rule on ‘manslaughter’ rather than premeditated murder and to reduce the 
penalty accordingly. The discussions on Jordan, Lebanon and Iraqi Kurdistan in this 
volume provide further evidence that it is rare indeed for a defendant to rely on 
particular provisions in national legislation that are the target of advocacy campaigns 
by those combating ‘crimes of honour’ (see Reem Abu Hassan, Daniel Hoyek et al 
and Nazand Begikhani).  These provisions provide for a reduced penalty in the event 
that a man finds his wife or certain female relatives in the act of extra-marital sex, and 
kills one or both of them on the spot. As Lama Abu Odeh (1997, 306) points out, in 
the case of ‘honour killings’ in Arab countries,  ‘the legal locus of these crimes is less 
the immediate legislation and more the general provocation rule found in almost every 
Arab Penal Code’. Sohail Warraich’s discussion in this volume of the use by Pakistani 
courts of the ‘grave and sudden provocation defence’ in cases of ‘honour killings’ 
provides considerable comparative material.  
 
There is a growing literature on the relationship and differences of crimes of 
honour and of passion. In the legal field, Abu Odeh (1997, 290) uses her earlier work 
on ‘crimes of honour’ in the Arab world in a comparative examination of the judicial 
treatment by US courts of ‘the killing of women in the heat of passion for sexual or 
intimate reasons.’ In focussing on how each legal system justifies its tolerance for the 
murder of a woman in particular circumstances, she demonstrates that the tensions in 
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 Statement by H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Permanent Representative of Jordan, 
Statement in Explanation of vote, Agenda Item 107: Advancement of Women, 55th Session of the 
General Assembly Third Committee, New York, 3 November 2000. 
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each system ‘although sometimes defined differently, have been surprisingly resolved 
in the same way’ – in particular this comparison is made between the ‘fit of fury’ 
mitigation in Arab penal codes and practice, and the US plea of extreme emotional 
distress, which builds on the premise that loss of ‘self-control’ reduces culpability.  
In-depth work on passion and the provocation defence in Western legal systems, 
notably Nourse (1997) on the US, whose work is cited by Abu Odeh, but also Leader-
Elliott (1997) on English and Australian law, reveals a ‘steadily widening conception 
of provocation’ (Leader-Elliott, 1997, 169) away from adultery, as ‘the classic source 
of adequate provocation, enforcing rules of gender relations grounded in an older idea 
of property’ (Nourse, 1997, 1341). The widening concept of sexual provocation in 
‘the West’ appears to afford women (as wives and lovers) less protection even as their 
legal rights to choose and/or to leave a relationship are increased. In her examination 
of ‘Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,’ Nourse finds that: 
 
Reform has permitted juries to return a manslaughter verdict in cases 
where the defendant claims passion because the victim left, moved the 
furniture out, planned a divorce, or sought a protective order.’ (1997 
1334). 13 
 
One difference that is often assumed between crimes of ‘passion’ and of 
‘honour’ is the relationship of the perpetrator to the victim. The difference here lies in 
the murder of women by those who are or have been their sexual intimates (husbands, 
lovers) and those who have not been (close blood relatives). Other than the 
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 Leader-Elliott, 1997, 169, in regard to whether sexual provocation should reduce murder to 
manslaughter, concludes that ‘given the disparity between the sexes in the matter of who kills whom, 
women may be far more likely than men to conclude that this particular claim to compassion is an 
anachronism.’  
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documented instances of the murder of women after incestual rape in ‘crimes of 
honour’, as noted above, it is the case that not only ‘family honour’ but also ‘conjugal 
honour’ may be cited as a ‘motivation’ by the perpetrator. The term ‘legitimate 
defence of honour’ in Brazil (see Sylvia Pimental, Valeria Pandjiarjian and Julia 
Belloque in this volume) refers to the wounded honour of a sexual intimate; how far 
this ‘motivation’ differs from the ‘shame’ experienced by a betrayed lover relying on 
sexual provocation as a defence is not immediately clear. Case studies in this volume 
indicate different findings as to what proportion of murderers were husbands of the 
victim. Commenting on research in Lebanon, Serhan posits that the greater number of 
husbands as perpetrators may reflect ‘a change in the conceptualization of family 
honour’ (Foster, 2001, 26). In Pakistan, figures from Sindh province from 1998 
illustrate that the husband was the perpetrator in nearly 50% of cases of karo-kari 
killings where the woman alone was killed (Amnesty International, 1996, 6). 
 
Even granted the paradigmatic family (as compared to conjugal) dynamic of 
‘honour’, the response of courts in the ‘West’ faced with defences of passion or 
provocation can be examined for similarities with those of courts faced with ‘honour’ 
defences, at least in considering the implications of a passion/honour continuum that 
recognises, at some point, a justification for the use of violence against women as a 
part of control by family and intimates.  As Leader-Elliott (1997, 169) asks in the 
context of law in the ‘West’:  
 
Is it not an unacceptable paradox that the progressive restriction of a 
husband’s power to exert lawful control over his wife has been 
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accompanied by a progressive enlargement of a partial excuse for killing 
her?  
 
The complex background to such developments across the world includes 
rapid social change among and within different countries and communities, and 
‘globalizing’ cultural dynamics (for example of ‘modernity’) that, as they are seen to 
open (some) women’s choices, may be experienced by (some) men as threats. Such 
factors vary in their impact in different communities, but have to be taken into 
account in an assessment of family violence. Baker, Gregware and Cassidy (1999, 
166) argue that ‘honor should be part of any current conceptualisation of patriarchy’ 
in comparative and cross-cultural analyses and that ‘honor systems are an integral part 
of the process of killing women by their families or intimates, regardless of where the 
woman lives’ (1999, 164). Their theory includes three comparative areas related to 
honour systems – the control of female behaviour, male feelings of shame at loss of 
that control, and community participation in “enhancing and controlling this shame.” 
In an article that draws on a large number of comparative illustrations, they are not 
arguing for a blanket use of ‘honour’ to understand ‘intimate-perpetrated female 
homicides’ in the US and elsewhere in the English-speaking West, but pointing out 
that it may apply to some of those murders, despite the general weakness or absence 
of the community participation element (see Sen in this volume), since it may be 
understood: 
 
as an ideology held by those who seek to hold on to patriarchal power in a 
competitive arena by mandating certain behaviours by others, notably 
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women. Here, the competitive arena may include the increasing demands 
for female equality. (1999, 173).  
 
Questioning the stereotypical  associations of ‘honour’ with  the ‘East’ and 
‘passion’ with the ‘West’ (Abu Odeh, 1997, 289), or ‘reason’ with the ‘North’ and 
‘irrational male violence and female passivity’ with the ‘South’ (Baker, Gregware and 
Cassidy, 173) is important  both to theory and to activism on issues of violence 
against women. It is important to identify commonalities as well as differences in the 
structure of violence. It is important to hold the mirror up also in the ‘West’ to a 
gendered construction of self involving issues of ownership and control and their role 
in perpetuating violence; and  generally to interrogate, in this regard, the application 
of the sexual provocation defence. At the most basic level of comparison, whether we 
are looking at the ‘fit of fury’ in Middle Eastern states, ‘violent emotion’ in a heat of 
passion in Latin America, or ‘extreme emotional distress’ in the US, it is clear that 
societies across the world – through their laws and their courts – continue to 
countenance defences that overwhelmingly benefit males committing violence against 
women. 
 
Crimes of honour and Muslim and minority communities  
 
Issues of definition and terminology come to the fore in the current 
international focus on and consequent perceived association of ‘crimes of honour’ 
with Muslim societies. At the beginning of the year 2000, Asma Jahangir, United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
included the following careful statement in her annual report:  
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The practice of “honour killings” is more prevalent although not limited to 
countries where the majority of the population is Muslim. In this regard it 
should be noted that a number of renowned Islamic leaders and scholars 
have publicly condemned this practice and clarified that it has no religious 
basis. 14    
 
The remarkably increased level of international attention being given to ‘crimes of 
honour’ (however or whether defined as such) brings with it a risk both of crude 
stereotypes and associations, and of a reaction that may act (or be used) to undermine 
counter-initiatives and to complicate domestic strategies of response. Jane Connors 
notes in this volume the objections made at the UN General Assembly to the 
association that certain Muslim majority states felt was being made between ‘crimes 
of honour’ and Islam. Particularly in the post-September 11 climate, where many 
largely Muslim communities are under attack from global powers, the potential of 
such risks is substantial, as discussed by Purna Sen in this volume. This does not 
mean that ‘crimes of honour’ cannot or should not be tackled by anyone other than 
‘insiders’, but it does require particularly rigorous attention to the construction of 
equal and honest engagements and alliances, and conscious efforts to avoid this being 
or becoming, for the ‘West’ (frequently self-presenting as the ‘international’), a 
particular and isolated problem of ‘the [already hostile] other.’ Awareness of ways in 
which global politics has created a backlash strengthening the forces of the religious 
right and increasing the spaces for their operation, and sensitivity to the changing geo-
                                                 
14
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/3,  25 January 2000, para. 78. 
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political context, must not imply the silencing of the long-standing struggle of women 
against violence, including violence in the name of ‘honour’. 
 
In a number of countries, those investigating and challenging ‘crimes of 
honour’ in their domestic contexts have invested effort in demonstrating the fallacy of 
the idea that there is support for such practices in the bodies of principles and rulings 
that make up Islamic law (see further Welchman 2005). Members of the shar`i 
establishments in different countries have been invited to make public statements on 
the issue in efforts to persuade constituents against the idea of religious endorsement, 
or indeed duty to commit acts of violence in the name of ‘honour’. On the other hand, 
a ‘traditionalist’ shar`i view advocating the implementation by the state of the severe 
hadd punishments for extra-marital sexual relations is not one espoused by civil 
society groupings currently joining efforts, nationally and regionally, seeking to 
eliminate ‘crimes of honour,’ nor by more general human rights efforts. Indeed, civil 
society groups active in combating ‘crimes of honour’ tend rather to argue for the de-
criminalisation of extra-marital sexual relations (and of same-sex relations) and an 
end to the state’s interest in the intimate relations of its citizens. 
 
The broader referential framework of strict control over sexual relations is  
present not only in dominant interpretations of Islamic law but at least officially in  
contemporary Muslim (and other) societies. This is provoked immediately in internal 
and international debates over ‘crimes of honour’, demands attention from advocates 
for change, and entangles issues of culture and tradition with issues of religion. In his 
contribution to this volume, Abdullahi An-Na`im examines the nature of internal 
alliances that can and in his view should be sought in processes of intra-community 
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dialogue aimed at challenging violence against women. His paper here builds on his 
earlier argument that efforts to eradicate such practices ‘must take into account and 
address not only every and all types of justifications, but also the cultural 
circumstances and underlying rationales that might cause the practice to continue in 
the particular community.’ (1994, 177).  Suad Joseph has also addressed this question 
of strategies in the context of the Middle East in particular, arguing that 
 
We must identify, recognize, and understand the different constructs and 
experiences of rights in order to figure out how we can build the ground 
on which to stand together to advocate human rights and women’s human 
rights. (1994, 9). 
 
However, for many others writing in this volume, as for many of our Project 
partners, a key element in their campaigns is to address the negation, through honour 
codes and the resulting regulation of sexuality, of women’s right to control over their 
body and indeed to sexual liberty (see Dina Siddiqi, Uma Chakravarti and Silvia 
Pimental et al). Issues that are particularly complex to address include the diversity in 
social practice in different Muslim societies, and the related and specific contestation 
of sexuality rights. The chapters in this volume deal almost entirely with heterosexual 
relations and practice, although the threat or incidence of ‘crimes of honour’ against 
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)  communities was 
noted by several authors, and is clearly an emerging concern for many. In relation to 
interference with the right to marry, for example, discussions held under the project’s 
auspices, as well as the process of providing legal advice on such cases to government 
agencies, surfaced the issue that the interference was in fact with whether as well as 
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with whom and when to marry, and this articulation created a space for discussion 
around the total denial of the rights of LGBT individuals in this sphere.15   
 
In majority Muslim societies, ‘crimes of honour’ are found to occur among 
non-Muslim communities. In a May 2001 conference in Beirut, the organizers invited 
leading figures from both Muslim and Christian religious establishments to clarify the 
lack of religious endorsement for ‘crimes of honour.’ In this volume, Bettiga notes the 
role of the church in endorsing patriarchal values that lie behind the use of violence in 
controlling women’s (particularly sexual) conduct. In situations where Muslims are a 
minority community, ‘crimes of honour’ occur across religions and cultures. In this 
volume, Hannana Siddiqui advocates the idea of a ‘mature multi-culturalism’ that 
neither denies equal protection to women from minority communities nor contributes 
to the essentialising and ‘othering’ of minority communities. In a related argument, 
Bredal critiques immigration-focussed approaches to tackling forced marriage 
currently being taken in Scandinavian states, both because they involve violations of 
human rights of men and women from minority communities in particular – to 
movement and to choice in marriage -- and because they deny agency to women from 
minority communities (all of this perpetrated in the name of protecting the rights of 
women). Hannana Siddiqui and Anja Bredal both argue that designing and 
implementing ‘good practice’ guidance for police, social support agencies and other 
authorities (including immigration authorities), and efforts to raise public awareness, 
must both be pursued in a manner that does not contribute to further violations of 
human rights.   
                                                 
15
 See report of the ‘National Consultation on Women’s Right to Choose If, When and Whom to 
Marry,’ organised by the Association for Advocacy and Legal Initiatives (AALI) in Lucknow, India, 
with support from INTERIGHTS and IWRAW-AP, in 2003; on file with authors and see also the 
project website. 
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Colonial laws 
 
Another relevant theme addressed in this volume is the continuing impact of 
the colonial legal heritage. In Pakistan, Sohail Warraich traces particular challenges 
arising from the combination of the re-introduction of the partial defence of ‘grave 
and sudden provocation’ (derived from nineteenth century British colonial law) with 
the application of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance (enacted as part of late twentieth 
century ‘Islamisation’ measures under a military dictatorship). Case studies from the 
Middle East stress the provenance of the criminal legislation now governing ‘crimes 
of honour’ – in particular in regard to defences to charges of murder in cases of 
‘honour killings’ – citing in this regard not only Ottoman penal law but the French 
Penal Code of 1810 identified as the source of certain Arab states’ legislation on these 
issues.  
 
These efforts are made, inter alia, in order to destabilise notions of such 
provisions being synonymous with ‘traditional heritage’ and something thoroughly 
‘indigenous’ to particular societies, to be defended as such against outside influence. 
In Lebanon, the late Laure Moghaizel, as early as 1986, reviewed partial excuses for 
husbands who surprise their wives in adulterous acts or situations, and in some cases 
for the parents of daughters under a certain age, as provided in Spanish, Portuguese, 
Turkish, Italian and French law, either still extant or recently repealed (Moghaizel, 
1986, 177). Bettiga’s paper in this volume examines Italian legislation on the ‘cause 
of honour,’ while the ‘legitimate defence of honour’ in Brazil and ‘heat of passion’ 
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defences (with associated causes of violation of ‘honour’) in other Latin American 
states are considered by Silvia Pimental, Valeria Pandjiarjian and Julia Belloque.  
 
Parallels are also found in criminal provisions in countries of the Middle East 
and Latin America that (broadly) provide for reduced or suspended penalties, or 
suspension of prosecution, if a man accused of rape or sexual assault marries his 
victim. In Egypt in 1999 a change made to the law of criminal procedure repealed a 
provision under which, according to one article in the British press, ‘in a case of rape, 
if the rapist and victim agree to marry then all charges will be dropped’ (Negus, 
1999). The law in question was rather more complicated, with a focus on the woman’s 
abduction; Dupret (2001) traces the origins of the repealed provision to French law, 
and variations of it remain in the penal law of for example Jordan and Palestine. 
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (1999) examines the subject in her exposition of the 
dilemmas faced by rape victims in Palestinian society and the clinicians who seek to 
help them and includes forced marriage to a rapist as within her definition of femicide 
(2002), giving a powerful illustration from her clinical experience involving a girl 
raped at the age of ten.  The concern of the girl’s family was to keep the crime secret 
and their solution was to have the rapist marry his victim when she came of age – the 
victim describes her mother speaking in terms of the rapist being forced into this 
marriage, with the agreement of his parents. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian comments: 
 
The battle becomes one between families. The power of the idea of 
“family honour”, as well as the need to protect and preserve it, defines the 
victim’s status and rights and frames the options that are open to deal with 
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the problem – in this case, marrying her own rapist. (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 
1999, 162). 
 
Pimental, Pandjiarjian and Belloque in this volume note variations of this 
provision in the laws of a number of Latin American states. In Brazil for example, a 
sexual offender cannot be punished ‘when he marries the victim or when she marries 
a third person.’ They find the legal reasoning here to be that ‘since the sexual violence 
has not impeded the marriage prospects of the victim, the crime should be forgiven.’ 
Their paper also shows the similarities between the laws of Latin American and 
Middle Eastern states in treatment of adultery, whether such penal provisions exist in 
current legislation or, as is often the case, have been recently repealed or amended.   
 
Playing for the other side 
 
Both the colonial heritage and contemporary global power structures (military, 
political, economic and other) necessarily complicate strategies of response to 
violence against women.  In addition to the complexities noted above, there are the 
considerable challenges faced by activists accused of playing for, or at least into the 
hands of, forces ranged against the country or community by merely raising the issue 
of ‘crimes of honour’ as one requiring questioning and reform. For example, during 
one of the debates in the Jordanian parliament on amending the Penal Code, certain 
deputies charged that the then recent national campaign and efforts to repeal the 
relevant law were attempts by the West to infiltrate Jordanian society and make 
Jordanian women immoral.16  Such perceptions, first, of immorality being endemic in 
                                                 
16
 Jordan Times 23 November 1999. 
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contemporary Western society and second, of the dissipating potential on local 
cultural norms of a hostile agenda of cultural imperialism, are widespread within non-
Western societies. Activists, particularly women’s rights activists, working in their 
societies on sexuality-related issues are vulnerable to attack by ‘conservative’ and 
‘Islamist’ groupings on grounds of ‘inauthenticity’, marginalisation and ‘secularism’. 
On the other hand, as noted by Hannana Siddiqui in this volume in regard to the anti-
racist left, they may be criticised by  ‘progressive’ or left groups, as well as by more 
conservative elements of minority communities, for the proverbial washing of dirty 
laundry in public. Similar tensions can be read in Aida Touma-Sliman’s narration of 
efforts within the Palestinian community in Israel. Nazand Begikhani describes how 
the dependence of Kurdish political movements in Iraqi Kurdistan on international 
support rendered them more responsive to advocacy for change promoted by 
international human rights groups such as Amnesty International, while at the same 
time noting significant internal resentment and resistance to the legal changes that 
followed. Abdullahi An-Na’im’s paper addresses this point directly, arguing that 
different types of advocacy work can and should be done by differently-placed actors, 
but that these need to include ‘agents of social change’ located inside their 
communities engaging in ‘intra-community dialogue’ to contribute to social change 
from within, and pondering the development of appropriate discourses and capacities 
for such work. Strategies – and capacities – differ. As Deniz Kandiyoti notes, in a 
consideration of the related topic of advocacy on the issues of gender and citizenship 
in the Middle East: 
 
Some argue forcefully for the expansion of women’s rights as individuals 
and condemn the stranglehold exercised over them by communal and 
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religious forces; others argue for working through kinship and communal 
structures that may act to empower and disempower women 
simultaneously. (Kandiyoti 2000, xv). 
 
The activists who have written  in this book work within their communities 
using  the human rights framework, and set out, in their different interventions, the 
use they make of law. Many papers also provide examples of how such groups engage 
with their societies outside the processes of the law, seeking to challenge and change 
social attitudes that condone any form of violence against women, joining forces in 
order to strengthen internal voices of resistance. 
 
As for the use by activists of external publicity and pressure, such as mobilising 
international public opinion, in many contexts, complex and strategic choices are 
involved.  In 2000, Farah Daghestani told a conference on ‘Sexuality in the Middle 
East’ that ‘honour killings’ of women ‘have been responsible for the worst 
international attention Jordan has received’: 
 
Through the sensationalization of the subject, the Western press has 
contributed to the issue becoming an even greater challenge for 
governments and religious leaders, pitting cultural identity and autonomy 
against cultural imperialism, at the expense of women. (Foster, 2001, 24). 
 
  It is of course the case that all types of governments tend to ‘blame the 
messenger,’ particularly messengers criticising human rights records. It is also the 
case that local strategies of response and resistance can be complicated and 
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undermined by external factors, which can include well-meant interventions as well as 
hostile (eg Islamophobic, or racist) ones, and of course global events. These 
challenges have been illustrated recently by the controversy over Norma Khoury’s 
story of an ‘honour killing’ in Jordan, Forbidden Love, withdrawn from sale in 
Australia by its publishers following challenges by Jordanian women’s rights activists 
to the book’s categorisation as a non-fiction ‘memoir’ (see further Abu Hassan in this 
volume). Other illustrations come in the particular challenges of combating violence 
against women in situations of conflict; in this volume, Nazand Begikhani, Nadera 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Aida Touma-Sliman all document the reduced attention that 
activists are able to give (and to attract) to these issues in times of military hostilities 
and threats to the particular national entity or community. 
 
Strategising Responses, and Creating Alternatives 
 
Thinking through the concept of ‘crimes of honour’ is one way of unpicking 
certain forms of violence against women. At the CIMEL/INTERIGHTS Roundtable, 
participants agreed on the strategic importance of identifying the value and advantage 
of, on the one hand, separating out a ‘crime of honour’ as a particular phenomenon or 
form of violence against women, and, on the other, campaigning on the various 
manifestations of ‘crimes of honour’ solely within the broader spectrum of violence 
against women. Some felt that caution needed to be exercised in not collapsing too 
many forms of violence against women into the category of ‘honour crimes.’ Others 
felt that while we used the term for tactical reasons, and as a convenient short hand to 
understand certain forms of violence, we needed constantly to be alive to our central 
concern, which was not an abstract exercise of disentangling or explicating the notion 
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as such, but understanding how it contributes to violence and how it violates basic 
human rights.  
 
The papers in this volume, we believe, provide material that will help in 
finding answers to a set of questions in regard to the phenomenon of ‘crimes of 
honour’. Is the term ‘crime of honour’ at all applicable or useful across cultures, 
languages, legal systems? Are the manifestations of such ‘crimes of honour’ (as 
defined locally, by perpetrators, courts, police, or survivors) comparable across time 
and place? What commonalities exist to justify recognition of some crimes of 
violence against women as ‘crimes of honour’? What variations challenge attempts to 
do so? Does the use of this category serve to essentialise certain forms of violence 
against women as being particular to a few cultures, communities or religions, thus 
facilitating further violations by states concerned of the rights of such women and of 
other members of their communities? Or does the articulation of such a category, 
despite the many associated pitfalls, nevertheless assist in understanding the nature of 
such violence, and further advocacy for the development of legislative, judicial and 
community-based strategies in response to such crimes? It is perhaps this last question 
with which the contributors to this volume are most engaged.  
 
In the opening chapter, Jane Connors presents the international legal 
framework regarding violence against women and in particular developments at the 
United Nations in regard to ‘crimes of honour.’ Purna Sen then considers the current 
political context of action against ‘crimes of honour, and the nature of alliances and 
coalitions that might be constructed around the issues involved. Abdullahi An-Na`im 
follows with a reflection on the human rights approach and the positioning of 
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activists, arguing for specific and sustained attention to processes of intra-community 
dialogue in building consensus against ‘crimes of honour.’ The book then moves on to 
a set of context-specific studies from Europe, Latin America, South Asia and the 
Middle East. These studies analyse primary sources and data (including legislation, 
cases, court records, interviews) and consider the approaches and impact of advocacy 
for change in the various specific contexts. We believe that despite definitional and 
other difficulties in using the term ‘crimes of honour’, the papers in this study 
illustrate at least two things: firstly, the entanglement of paradigms of ‘honour’ in a 
variety of manifestations of violence against women, and secondly, the willingness of 
a broad range of individuals and organisations from across the world to join their 
efforts to an undertaking aimed at presenting voices of resistance in a comparative 
context.  
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